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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Equal Pay Act provides that, “No employer . . . shall discrimi-
nate . . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to em-
ployees . . . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to em-
ployees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the performance of 
which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility.”1 
No profession is more suited to equal pay than the job of law pro-
fessor.2 In terms of “equal work on jobs the performance of which re-
quires equal skill, effort and responsibility,” we are all required to teach 
the same number of courses per semester and we serve on the same 
number of committees. While there may be a variance in terms of the 
number of articles and books published and where they are placed, that 
is often reflected by a separate summer research stipend that rewards 
those who publish more. There may be administrative roles that are in 
addition to teaching, scholarship, and service roles but that additional 
work, too, is typically reflected in an additional administrative stipend. 
                                                       
* Professor of Law and Founding Director, Women, Leadership & Equality Program, 
University of Maryland Carey School of Law, J.D. University of Virginia School of Law 
(1983), B.A. Yale College (1980). The author would like to thank Susan G. McCarty and Mi-
chael Tennison for their research assistance. 
 1. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012) (quoted in Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. 
Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & 
L. 159, 160 (2011)).  
 2. Note that my colleague, Professor Deborah Thompson Eisenberg has done excel-
lent work on the fact that in professional positions, the pay gap is larger than in lower-paid, 
less professional jobs. The more subjective evaluation process explains some of this and her 
article,  Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L. REV. 17 (2010), is one of the 
most persuasive arguments for reform in this area. 
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So the basic professorial salary covers almost exactly the same work. 
How, then, did the following situation occur? 
  The federal commission that investigates discrimination in 
the workplace has threatened to sue the University of Denver’s 
law school over what the commission calls a “continuing pat-
tern” of paying female professors less than their male col-
leagues.  
  In a letter sent to the university on Friday, the director of 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s office in Den-
ver wrote that an EEOC investigation found a gender pay gap 
among the school’s legal faculty dating back to at least 1973. 
The commission concluded that the university knew about the 
gap by 2012, “but took no action to ameliorate this disparity, in 
effect intentionally condoning and formalizing a history of wage 
disparity based on sex.” 
  The EEOC’s investigation came after longtime DU law 
school professor Lucy Marsh filed a complaint with the commis-
sion more than two years ago. Marsh’s attorney on Monday pro-
vided a copy of the letter to The Denver Post.  
  Marsh said the law school could have to pay as much as 
$1.2 million in total damages to its female law professors, in ad-
dition to paying them salaries going forward equal to what their 
male colleagues in similar positions are paid.3 
After Professor Marsh filed her complaint with the EEOC in 2013: 
  The university hired a consultant to evaluate the law 
school’s pay structure in 2014. According to the university’s 
statement, the consultant concluded there is no evidence that 
gender plays a role in setting pay and that pay disparities result 
from a combination of a professor’s rank, duties, age and per-
formance scores. 
  But Melissa Hart, a University of Colorado law professor 
who specializes in employment law, said that type of structure 
can create exactly the problem the EEOC identified. Federal law 
requires a school to take action if its pay structure creates gen-
der inequality, even if the discrimination isn’t intentional, she 
said. 
                                                       
 3. John Ingold, EEOC Accuses DU Law School of Discriminating Against Women 
Professors, DENVER POST, Aug. 31, 2015, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_28735459/eeoc-
accuses-du-law-school-discriminating-against-women. The article goes on: “In 2012, Marsh, 
who has worked at DU’s law school since 1973, was the school’s lowest-paid full professor, 
making $109,000 a year. The school’s median salary that year for full professors was 
$149,000.” Id. 




“That’s what the Equal Pay Act says,” Hart said. “If you see it, 
you have to fix it.”4 
This wage gap in academia—even when controlling for rank—has 
been clearly documented.5 This paper will focus on the affirmative de-
fenses to the Equal Pay Act that play a central role in perpetuating this 
pay gap in legal academia. These include exceptions for prior salary, 
competing offers, and negotiation. These affirmative defenses fall under 
the rubric of “market excuses” and their existence eviscerates the very 
law that was meant to make the practice of paying men and women dif-
ferently illegal. 
The paper will describe case law that interprets these affirmative 
defenses and applies the analysis in those cases to two recent, high-
profile cases in the legal academic workplace. It will describe the cur-
rent state of play in legal academia in terms of compensation decisions 
and the disparate impact that these practices have on women faculty 
and possible solutions, including the Paycheck Fairness Act.6  
II. THE EQUAL PAY ACT AND MARKET DEFENSES 
The Equal Pay Act was enacted in 1963 to remedy pay discrimina-
tion based on sex.7 But even if a female professor can make a prima facie 
case that her pay is less than that of a similarly situated male professor 
who teaches the same number of classes, sits on the same number of 
committees, and publishes the same number of articles, the law school 
can raise an affirmative defense based on “any other factor other than 
                                                       
 4. Id. Professor Hart has written an excellent article on pay disparity in academia 
and the Lucy Marsh case in particular, Melissa Hart, Missing the Forest for the Trees: Gen-
der Pay Discrimination in Academia, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 873 (2014). This paper will focus 
on how that case and a recent case at the University of Texas School of Law illustrate the 
holes in the Equal Pay Act as it applies to female faculty in the legal academy and the norms 
used to determine on compensation. It will not address pay discrimination actions under 
Title VII which, unlike the Equal Pay Act, is generally construed to require intentional dis-
crimination. 
 5. MARTHA S. WEST & JOHN W. CURTIS, AM. ASS’N UNIV. PROFESSORS (AAUP), 
AAUP FACULTY GENDER EQUITY INDICATORS 12 (2006), 
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/63396944-44BE-4ABA-9815-
5792D93856F1/0/AAUPGenderEquityIndicators2006.pdf. This author has explored pay and 
other gender disparities in legal academia in two previous articles, Paula A. Monopoli, Gen-
der and the Crisis in Legal Education: Remaking the Academy in Our Image, 2012 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 1745, and Paula A. Monopoli, In a Different Voice: Lessons from Ledbetter, 34 J. 
COLL. & U. L. 555 (2008).  
 6. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 862, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 7. Pub. L. No. 98-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963). See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 
160 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) providing that “No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . be-
tween employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the 
rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the 
performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility.”). 
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sex.”8 The institution can argue that the pay differential is not based on 
sex but rather it is based on the market which is allegedly free from bi-
as. Known as the “fourth affirmative defense” in Equal Pay Act cases, a 
number of scholars have questioned the assumption that the market is 
in fact free from bias and have made an empirical case that using mar-
ket-based factors like prior salaries and competing offers is infected with 
the bias that existed when those prior salaries were set or those compet-
ing offers were formulated.9 
In their article, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay Discrimination 
Cases, Nicole Porter and Jessica Vartanian make the case that the mar-
ket is not neutral in two ways. First, employers are subject to implicit 
bias that causes them “to value male employees more than female em-
ployees for reasons unrelated to skill or productivity.”10 A subsequent 
employer then uses that “erroneous valuation” to either match the high-
er salary of an incoming male recruit or when an existing male employ-
ee uses a competing offer to ratchet up their existing salary. “Therefore, 
prior salaries and outside offers do not represent a “neutral” market sys-
tem . . . .”11 Second, the same unconscious bias that creates this “errone-
ous valuation” of women’s worth also affects the way in which employers 
react when women respond to an initially low offer with a counteroffer.12 
Women are reluctant to negotiate, in part, due to social norms against it 
and in part because even when they do, “employers take a much tougher 
stance against female employees who negotiate than male employees 
who negotiate.13 Accordingly, employers’ reliance on “willingness to ne-
gotiate” should not be allowed to justify paying women less than a 
man.”14 
Porter and Vartanian note that prior salary appears to be the most 
frequently deployed market defense.15 For example, in Wernsing v. De-
partment of Human Services: 
[T]he plaintiff stated a prima facie case by demonstrating that 
she and a male co-worker received disparate starting monthly 
                                                       
 8. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv). (Once a plaintiff establishes that a pay disparity ex-
ists, the burden shifts to the employer to establish that the difference is attributable to a 
seniority system, a merit system, a sytem which is based on quantity or quality of production 
or that “(iv) a differential was based on any other factor other than sex.” Id. 
 9. See, e.g., ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER 
INEQUALITY: COURTS, MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY IN AMERICA (1999); Porter & Vartanian, 
supra note 1, at 163; see also Sharon Rabin-Marglioth, The Market Defense, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 807 (2010); Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 579 (2001); Debo-
rah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Apporach to Pay Dis-
crimination, 43 ARIZ. STATE L. J. 951 (2011); Deborah Brake, Reviving Paycheck Fairness: 
Why and How the Factor-Other-Than-Sex Defense Matters, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 889 (2016). 
 10. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 164. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 176. 




salaries ($2,478 compared to $3,739) for substantially the same 
work. In defense, the Department alleged that the disparity was 
justified as a “factor other than sex” because the two employees’ 
salaries, like all other employees in the Department, were set 
pursuant to its company policy to “give lateral entrants a salary 
at least equal to what they had been earning” previously. Alt-
hough the court did not deny the possibility that a prior salary 
could be discriminatory, it reasoned that discrimination “is 
something to be proved rather than assumed.” Because the 
plaintiff failed to even suggest that her or her male colleague’s 
prior salary was discriminatory, the court affirmed the lower 
court’s grant of summary judgement in the Department’s favor.16 
And competing offers have successfully been used as a defense as well. 
In Winkes v. Brown University:  
[T]he First Circuit upheld the defendant’s decision to match a 
competing offer as a valid “factor other than sex.” The case in-
volved art instructors in a two-person department at Brown 
University, Rudolf Winkes and Catherine Zerner, both earning 
$18,000 a year. When Zerner received a competing offer from 
Northwestern University for $25,000, the defendant matched it 
in an effort to retain her, increasing Winkes salary to just 
$19,500. . . . [T]he court upheld the defendant’s market excuse 
despite the finding that such an extensive raise would not have 
been offered to a man and testimony from a university chairper-
son that Winkes and Zerner were equals in virtually every re-
spect other than sex.17 
Finally, Porter and Vartanian note that the market defenses in-
clude the ability of an employer to use the fact that a male employee 
negotiated for more compensation as a defense to paying a male employ-
ee who does the same work more than his female counterpart.18 In one 
case: 
The plaintiff was receiving $7500 annually as a physical educa-
tion instructor for the defendant.  Shortly after hiring the plain-
tiff, the defendant offered a male physical education instructor 
the standard $7500, but the male instructor was unwilling to ac-
cept less than $9,000. The court accepted salary negotiation as a 
factor other than sex, stating “an employer may consider the 
                                                       
 16. Id. at 177 (citing Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 467 (7th 
Cir. 2005)). 
 17. Id. at 177–78 (citing Winkes v. Brown Univ., 747 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1984), and 
noting that the University had entered into a consent decree to “cure claims of discrimination 
under Title VII, a fact that went a long way to persuade the court in finding the defendant’s 
actions to retain a valued female instructor reasonable.”).  
 18. Id. at 178–79 (citing Horner v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706, 714 (8th Cir. 1980)). 
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market place value of the skill of a particular individual when 
determining his or her salary.”19   
Porter and Vartanian note that several lower courts have made 
similar determinations and cite a North Dakota District Court case in 
which the court, “found that an employer paying a male employee a 
higher salary than a female performing the same job does not violate the 
EPA where the male demanded more pay during salary negotiation.”20  
And the District Court for the District of Maryland, “in a reverse EPA 
claim also accepted salary negotiation as a defense to a sex-based wage 
disparity saying that the “only difference was that McNierey accepted 
the $33,000 while Ms. Inglesh . . . negotiated and received an extra 
$2,000.”21  Finally, a similar result obtained in New York where the em-
ployer argued the male employee refused to work for less and that was a 
factor other than sex.22 
III. APPLYING MARKET EXCUSES TO LEGAL ACADEMIA 
The definition of merit in academia is highly subjective, based in 
large part on the rank of the journal one publishes in and how often one 
publishes.23 It also turns on the field one publishes in, with constitu-
                                                       
 19. Id. 
 20. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 179 (citing Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518 F. 
Supp. 1309, 1318 (D.N.D. 1981)). 
 21. Id. at 179 (citing McNierney v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 853, 860 (D. Md. 
1995)). 
 22. Id. at 179 (citing McHenry v. One Beacon Ins. Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46573 
at *36 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)). 
 23. To the degree that teaching is valued at all, there is also substantial evidence 
that teaching evaluations are skewed by gender bias as well. See, e.g., Anne Boring et al., 
Student Evaluations of Teaching (Mostly) Do Not Measure Teaching Effectiveness, 
SCIENCEOPEN RES. (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.scienceopen.com/document/vid?id=0bc459de-
6f8f-487f-b925-863834a74048. See also Joey Sprague & Kelley Massoni, Student Evaluations 
and Gendered Expectations: What We Can’t Count Can Hurt Us, 53 SEX ROLES 779, 791 
(2005). The authors write: 
 
Note that students’ memories of their worst-ever teachers appear to be more 
emotionally charged than their memories of their best-ever teachers and that the 
most hostile words are saved for women teachers. The worst women teachers are 
sometimes explicitly indicted for being bad women through the use of words like 
bitch and witch. Students may not like their arrogant, boring and disengaged 
men teachers, but they may hate their mean, unfair, rigid, cold, and “psychotic” 
women teachers. These findings are substantiated by the observations of other 
feminist researchers who have reported incidents of student hostility toward 
women instructors who are perceived as not properly enacting their gender role 
or who present material that challenges gender inequality. . . . That is, women 
teachers may be called on to do more of what sociologists call emotional labor, la-
bor that is frequently invisible and uncounted. Thus, if teachers are being held 
accountable to, and are attempting to meet, gendered standards, then women 
and men may be putting out very different levels of effort to achieve comparable 
results. If it takes more for a woman to get a 5 and she nearly kills herself to do 
it, that difference in effort will not be measurable on student rating scales. 
 
 




tional law at the top of the hierarchy and family law and gender-related 
issues at the bottom.24 And pay is often tied to the ability to move later-
ally, with visiting positions often required, a practice that dispropor-
tionately adversely affects women, who are less likely to have spouses 
who will follow them.25 Compounding these subjective evaluation pro-
cesses is that fact that courts have historically been more reluctant to 
intervene in higher education discrimination cases, including race and 
gender cases, giving even more deference to university and colleges than 
other types of employers.26 
There have been two high profile cases in legal academia in the 
past several years that present useful illustrations of why amending the 
“any other factor other than sex” defense with an alternative like “bona 
fide factor other than sex, such as education, training or experience” can 
make the Equal Pay Act more effective. The first case is that of Profes-
sor Lucy Marsh, noted above, of the University of Denver Sturm College 
of Law. Marsh was the lowest paid faculty member at the school after 
forty years of teaching. The second case involved the release of docu-
ments pursuant to a Texas Public Information Act request by faculty 
members at the University of Texas School of Law documenting previ-
ously undisclosed compensation in the form of six-figure forgivable loans 
to certain faculty members, very few of whom were women. A discussion 
of the two cases, and how the “any other factor other than sex” defense 
is an exception that swallows the rule, illustrates why market excuses 
are so pernicious in terms of gender pay disparities in legal academia. 
A. The University of Denver Case 
In the first case, Professor Lucy Marsh was at a private school that 
did not publish faculty salaries.27 In an effort to discover whether female 
faculty members were paid less across the board, Professor Marsh be-
came aware that she was in fact the lowest paid faculty member at the 
institution.28 She persisted in asking the dean to correct the salary dis-
parity.29 However, in making raises from the pool given by the universi-
                                                                                                                                
Id. at 791 (internal citations omitted). 
 24. See Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of 
All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483 (2012) (ranking constitutional law articles among the most 
cited of all time).  
 25. See, e.g., Joan Williams, What Stymies Women’s Academic Careers? It’s Person-
al, THE CHRON FOR HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 15, 2000, at B10. 
 26. Barbara A. Lee et al., Implications of Comparable Worth for Academe, 58 J. 
HIGHER EDUC. 609, 618–20 (1987).  
 27. See Melissa Hart, Missing the Forest for the Trees: Gender Pay Discrimination 
in Academia, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 873, 890 (2014) (“[T]he University of Denver is like most 
private employers in maintaining secrecy about salaries.”). 
 28. Professor Lucy Marsh: Attachment to EEOC Intake Questionnaire, 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/152792415/EEOC-addendum. 
 29. Id.  
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ty, he stated in a memo that those raises were made without correcting 
for gender disparities.30 
In her article Missing the Forest for the Trees: Gender Pay Discrim-
ination in Academia, Professor Melissa Hart explores the structures 
that contribute to gender pay disparity in academic work and looks 
closely at the Lucy Marsh case.31 Hart’s article astutely points out the 
recurring strategic “move” of changing the focus from the institution to 
the individual in these cases, some of which is driven by the very struc-
ture of the statutes themselves.32 After Lucy Marsh decided to file a 
complaint with the EEOC, the law school responded by noting that her 
performance was “sub-standard”, despite her having received teaching 
awards and accolades from the state supreme court for her experiential 
teaching.33 
But perhaps the most salient fact was that the dean stated in his 
memorandum explaining how he had allocated the funds received as 
part of a university-wide “Faculty Salary Competitiveness Initiative”: 
I want to briefly reference gender-based equity considerations, 
as I know that our late colleague Ann Scales had asked about 
this issue and others have expressed interest in it as well. In 
this round of the Initiative, funds were limited to the top 25 per-
formers without regard to trying to correct potential inequities. . 
. . For Full Professors (excluding the former dean), females con-
stitute 32% of the group and receive 30% of the salary dollars, 
both before and after this round of raises. The median salary for 
female Full Professors was $7,532/year less than that for males 
before this round of raises and $11,282/year less than that for 
males after this round of raises. The mean salary for female Full 
Professors was $14,870/year less than that for males before this 
round of raises and $15,859/year less than for males after this 
round of raises.34 
The dean went on to argue that the figures calculated could not be 
understood in a vacuum and that there were three reasons for the dif-
ferentials including (1) different starting salaries due to variations in 
                                                       
 30. Ingold, supra note 3 (quoting Memo from  Dean of Univ. of Denver Sch. of Law 
to Tenured, Tenure Track, and Long Term Contract Law Faculty (Dec. 13, 2012), “In the 
2012 memo, which explained how $1.5 million in raises was awarded that year, [the] law 
school dean noted the gender pay disparity but said raises would be given ‘without regard to 
trying to correct potential inequities.’ After the raises, female full professors on average 
made nearly $16,000 a year less than their male counterparts.”). 
 31. See Hart, supra note 27.  
 32. Id. at 877. 
 33. Ingold, supra note 3 (“In a statement, the law school defended its merit-based 
pay structure and blamed Marsh for her lower salary, saying she showed ‘sub-standard per-
formance in scholarship, teaching and service.’”). 
 34. Memo from  Dean of Univ. of Denver Sch. of Law to Tenured, Tenure Track, 
and Long Term Contract Law Faculty (Dec. 13, 2012), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/152790023/DU-Faculty-Competitiveness.  




teaching and legal experience “as well as any special circumstances or 
deals that may have affected that number,” (2) differences in merit rais-
es over many years and (3) different circumstances in salary histories 
including “offers from other schools or lasting salary effects from holding 
administrative positions.”35 The dean concludes by offering to do an in-
dividual analysis of any one salary and argues that only through such 
an analysis can one determine if an inequity exists.36 However, he warns 
that “unless I have strong evidence to the contrary, I will need to as-
sume that all of my predecessors’ merit raises were accurate reflections 
of performance.”37 Much like Hart notes in her article, the move is to-
ward an individualized rationale and away from systemic gender bias in 
pay. 
The lack of transparency at a private law school contributed in a 
significant way to the female faculty’s difficulty in even being able to 
document that pay disparity existed.38 Denver University Law Professor 
Ann Scales began the quest for this information.39 Her untimely death 
and Lucy Marsh’s admirable decision to continue the work of uncovering 
the data was the only way for the disparity to begin to be ameliorated. 
That is hardly a way to create an incentive for the law to work without 
enforcement and litigation. In addition, the explicit reliance on past 
merit decisions illustrates nicely the point Porter and Vartanian make 
about past salaries and other compensation decisions not being the 
product of a neutral market but rather being infected with gender bias 
themselves. Relying on these decisions going forward and being able to 
rely on these as a defense to the Equal Pay Act seems an enormous ex-
ception that consumes the rule itself. Similarly, the lack of transparency 
in pay makes it impossible for women to negotiate equal compensation, 
similarly a defense to an EPA claim. This, too, seems like a vast excep-
tion to the rule that threatens to make the rule toothless. So how do 
women faculty fare when they are at public universities in states that 
require public employee compensation be made public each year? As we 
shall see, still not so well. 
B. The University of Texas Case 
Even when a faculty member works at a public institution that re-
quires publication of all faculty salaries, she may still be the victim of 
pay disparity. In 2011, a group of faculty members filed a Texas Public 
                                                       
 35. Id. at 4. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id.  
 38. See Hart, supra note 27, at 890 (“Only when the dean of the law school, in an ef-
fort to be more transparent, circulated a memo to the faculty identifying a significant differ-
ence in median pay for male and female full professors did the possibility of a direct chal-
lenge to that disparity become evident.”). 
 39. Professor Lucy Marsh, Attachment to EEOC Intake Questionnaire, 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/152792415/EEOC-addendum. 
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Information Act request that revealed the existence of a non-public pro-
gram, funded by the law school’s Foundation and used to compensate 
certain faculty members.40 This additional compensation came largely in 
the form of “forgivable loans” that need not be paid back if certain terms 
involving length of stay were met.41 The rules in Texas required that 
faculty member salaries be published every year since the institution is 
a state school.42 These “loans” were not included in the published sala-
ries of the faculty who received them.43 When the loans were made pub-
lic, the dean justified them on the basis of recruiting star faculty from 
around the country and retaining them.44 This would presumably meet 
the “any other factor other than sex” market defense under the Equal 
Pay Act.45 
The December 2014 Report of the Texas Attorney General gives an 
inside view of how faculty hiring really works and it is not a system fa-
vorable to women.46 Using dominantly masculine terms like “free agent” 
to describe the legal hiring market and having a “war chest” to recruit 
the “very best faculty,” the former dean who began the program (not the 
dean in place when it was revealed) yields a glimpse of a system of fac-
ulty hiring suited more to professional baseball than to law schools.47 
Allowing such decisions to be essentially exempt from the Equal Pay Act 
because of market excuses completely vitiates any real protection for 
female faculty. It belies any idea of fair and equal consideration on the 
merits.  
At Texas, a separate law school foundation raised and managed 
funds used for this additional compensation.48 The foundation was 
housed in the law school and it shared staff with the law school at one 
point in its existence.49 The board  deferred to the dean’s view of who 
was a valuable faculty member, worthy of paying a premium to recruit 
                                                       
 40. Ralph K. M. Haurwitz, AG’s Office Wraps Up Investigation of Forgivable Loans 
at UT Law School, STATESMAN (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/state-
regional-govt-politics/ags-office-wraps-up-investigation-of-forgivable-lo/njqR5/ (“Until a 2011 
open-records request by three UT law professors, it wasn’t publicly known that about 20 of 
their colleagues had received forgivable loans from the Law School Foundation . . . .”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.022(a)(2) (West 2011) (listing government employ-
ee salary as a category of public information). 
 43. See Haurwitz, supra note 40.  
 44. Univ. Tex, Report and Recommendations on the Relationship Between the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin School of Law and the University of Texas Law School Foundation 
19 (Oct. 15, 2012), 
https://static.texastribune.org/media/documents/FINAL_Report_and_Recommendations_date
d_10-15-2012_2.PDF. 
 45. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012).  
 46. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS GREG ABBOTT, REPORT (2014), 
https://www.utsystem.edu/sites/utsfiles/documents/board-regents/attorney-general-report-ut-
austin-law-school-foundation/report-release-redacted.pdf. [hereinafter Attorney General 
Report].  
 47. Id. at 16. 
 48. Id. at 4.  
 49. Id. at 8.  




or retain.50 The faculty budget committee was not told about the 
amounts of the additional compensation.51  
These forgivable loans were given disproportionately to male facul-
ty.52 One of the few female faculty members who had received such a 
loan had to threaten a lawsuit to get one.53 A well-known legal scholar, 
she sent a demand letter to the dean stating that the law school was not 
in compliance with the Equal Pay Act with regard to her compensa-
tion.54 According to the findings of the Attorney General in his Report, 
the dean settled the matter.55 The settlement included increased state 
compensation and a $250,000 forgivable loan.56 
In the wake of the Public Information Act request and the disclo-
sure of the loan program, the president of the university asked the dean 
for his resignation citing deep divisions at the law school.57 The local 
papers noted that one aspect of the controversy was gender pay dispari-
ty: “The resignation comes after three UT law professors made an open 
records request for financial information. The records show several sex 
discrimination complaints by women and a possible “gender pay gap,” 
the Texas Tribune says.”58 
                                                       
 50. See Ralph K. M. Haurwitz, UT’s Powers, Law Dean Differ on Circumstances of 
$500,000 Loan, STATESMAN, Dec. 14, 2011, http://www.statesman.com/news/news/local/uts-
powers-law-dean-differ-on-circumstances-of-500/nRh3J/ (“Marilyn Phelan, a former general 
counsel for the Texas Tech University System and the outhor of a book on nonprofit organi-
zation law, … described the foundation’s role as little more than rubber-stamping the dean’s 
recommendations.”). 
 51. Id. at 22. 
 52. See Attorney General Report, Exhibit C, 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/static.texastribune.org/media/documents/Haurwitz_et_al__Redacte
d_Report_for_Release.PDF (listing twenty-one faculty members who received forgivable 
loans, only three of whom were female). 
 53. Attorney General Report at 23.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Haurwitz, supra note 50.  
 58. Debra Cassens Weiss, UT Law Dean Asked to Resign over ‘Divided Atmosphere’ 
Caused by Faculty Largesse, A.B.A. JOURNAL, Dec. 9, 2011, 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ut_law_dean_asked_to_resign_over_divided_atmosp
here_caused_by_faculty_large/. The outgoing dean established a Gender Equity Task Force 
as one of his last acts that was charged with examining “all tenure and tenure-track faculty 
compensation information, including loan agreement information, to determine whether 
[the] compensation structure raises gender equity concerns . . . .” Letter from Dean to Col-
leagues, http://static.texastribune.org/media/documents/Letter_to_My_Colleagues.doc (last 
visited April 28, 2016). The dean noted that the Task Force might consider “the temporary 
freezing of some group of salaries” as one means of correcting any inequities found. See id. 
Note that the current dean says that such loans are no longer given but certain, more modest 
funds are still used to recruit and retain faculty. Those amounts are included in the pub-
lished compensation numbers. Reeve Hamilton & Morgan Smith, UT President Asks Law 
School Dean to Resign Immediately, TEX. TRIB., Dec. 8, 2011, 
http://www.texastribune.org/2011/12/08/dean-ut-law-signs-letter-resignation/; See Haurwitz, 
supra note 50.  
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The documents released as a result of the Public Information Act 
request include a letter from a female professor that illustrates the 
problem with not knowing—even in a public system that requires the 
information to be published—the total amount of compensation of col-
leagues due to off-the-books compensation.59 In several meetings with 
the dean which she documents in a subsequent letter to him, this pro-
fessor communicates her view that she was being undercompensated vis 
a vis a male colleague. She states that in her first meeting with the dean 
about this view, she was asked to take on an additional committee as-
signment:  
Thank you for meeting with me recently to discuss my concerns 
about gender equity in pay and institutional governance as-
signments at the law school in general, and gender-based ineq-
uities in my salary in particular. . . .  
In our first meeting, . . . I explained to you it is my belief that 
my salary is substantially lower than identifiable male faculty 
members who perform substantially equal work on jobs requir-
ing equal skill, effort and responsibility, and that there are no 
factors other than gender that explain this pay gap. I also reit-
erated my request that you appoint more women to the Budget 
Committee, in light of serious questions about gender pay ineq-
uities at the law school and the charge to the Budget Committee 
to constitute a gender equity subcommittee. As I said during our 
meeting, women are underrepresented on all the major govern-
ing committees at UT law school. With respect to the Budget 
Committee in particular, I cannot see how a committee com-
prised of eight men and one woman can put together a credible 
gender equity committee.60 
The female professor then memorializes what the dean said in re-
sponse, in terms of historical factors that may have led to the salary gap 
and the budget limitations that he was dealing with that did not allow 
him to fix it.61 According to her letter, the dean would not share the sal-
aries of other faculty members so they could have an informed discus-
sion of whether there was a gender gap.62 Instead, she notes that he 
asked her to do more work by joining the budget committee.63 Already 
teaching a heavy load and chairing the time-consuming tenure commit-
tee, the professor declined and recommended two other female faculty 
                                                       
 59. See Letter from Professor to Dean, Public Information Act disclosure, Open Rec-
ords Request, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 10, 2011), 
http://static.texastribune.org/media/documents/ut_law_school_open_records.pdf (hereinafter 
Letter from Professor to Dean). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 




members, both of whom had consistently asked to serve on the budget 
committee but had not been appointed.64 
What is striking about the letter is that it asserts that the dean 
confirmed in a second meeting that at least one male faculty member 
made $30,000 more than the female professor for: 
[P]erforming substantially equal work on a job requiring equal 
skill, effort and responsibility. In fact of course, when you con-
sider teaching load, institutional governance responsibility, and 
other measures of contributions to the law school mission, I per-
form substantially more work each year than that particular 
male colleague does. In light of this gender gap, you promised 
that you would seek a substantial raise for me during the cur-
rent salary cycle.65 
It is not clear how effective this negotiation, documented in the let-
ter she wrote after the meeting, was, since the salary data released in 
the Public Information Act request by faculty did not go beyond the 
2010-2011 academic year. The professor received a verbal agreement to 
remedy the situation but was also asked to do even more institutional 
service work, which she declined.66 This letter illustrates what many 
female faculty members already know; even if women do ask for appro-
priate pay, they are often asked to do more for the same pay.67 And ne-
gotiating pay is behavior that is outside acceptable gender norms in our 
society, and women are often met with resistance.68  
C. Lessons Learned 
So what do these two recent cases in academia and the attendant 
memoranda and letters that have been made public tell us about how 
the Equal Pay Act and its market defenses contribute to the slow pro-
gress of women’s full pay equity in legal academia? First, they reveal a 
compensation game grounded in an arms race mentality for U.S. News 
Rankings as a measure of faculty quality, one replete with competitive 
masculine norms. As the Texas dean said to his faculty in an explanato-
ry memorandum: 
                                                       
 64. See id. 
 65. See Letter from Professor to Dean, supra note 59. 
 66. See id. 
 67. There is significant empirical data that shows that men are evaluated based on 
their future potential (because of gender schemas about competence), and women are judged 
only on actual achievements and this letter reflects a variation on that principle—more work 
for the same pay. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS & CONSUELA A. PINTO, FAIR MEASURE: TOWARD 
EFFECTIVE ATTORNEY EVALUATIONS 19–21 (ABA 2d ed. 2008). 
 68. Yuki Noguchi, Some Companies Fight Pay Gap by Eliminating Salary Negotia-
tions, NPR (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/23/401468571/some-companies-fight-
pay-gap-by-eliminating-salary-negotiations.  
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Those [aggressive and generous compensation practices at Har-
vard, Yale and NYU] have become the norm, not the exception, 
among top twenty law schools. They are the practices with 
which we have had to contend in the course of our faculty build-
ing. I cannot speak with confidence of Yale’s fabled offers in the 
$500,000 to $600,000 range, but in our own experience, candi-
dates whom we have wished to hire have been offered more than 
$400,000 a year, along with other substantial emoluments of the 
sort I will describe below. 
  . . . . 
 . . . We, too, have frequently included non-salary commitments, 
in the form of one-time loans. These have been accompanied 
with a promise on our part to defray the costs of repaying the 
loan in annual installments of five or seven years, provided that 
the recipient of the loan remains on our faculty. . . . 
Many of our lateral hires have received such loans. In some cas-
es, I was responding directly to one-time bonus offers by other 
schools. In other cases, I was trying to meet generous offers 
made on other terms by competing schools. These other terms 
included, in addition to a high annual salary, substantial hous-
ing assistance, generous college tuition benefits, massive pro-
grammatic funds, and the prospect of university professorships. . 
. .  
During the same period, some of our own colleagues came to be 
at immediate risk of departure. . . . The loan arrangements [to 
existing faculty] were intended to make it attractive for our col-
leagues and their partners to back away from the brink and re-
new their commitment to remain members of our community.69 
Second, they reveal a lack of transparency even in public law 
schools that were by law mandated to reveal salary information. Not 
only were the loans at issue in Texas not reflected in published salary 
data, for many years they were not revealed to the faculty members on 
the budget committee: 
Parallel to these events has been the question of the openness of 
our compensation commitments to faculty review. When I be-
came Dean, at least three categories of compensation were not 
available for review by the Budget Committee: summer research 
stipends; most other salary supplements described in various 
ways, including “housing” supplements; and the loan arrange-
ments described above. At the outset of my deanship, the Budget 
Committee urged me to make information about all aspects of 
our compensation available. I declined to do so. I was accus-
                                                       
 69. See Letter from Dean to Colleagues, supra note 58, at 1–2. 




tomed to a law school compensation environment typical of al-
most every elite American law school—an environment in which 
faculty members could and did engage with the Dean about 
their own compensation packages, but did not know how that 
package compared to their colleagues’ compensation. This is true 
even in a number of state schools, where the official reported 
compensation excludes key compensation arrangements, ar-
rangements most typically associated with large-ticket housing 
support.70 
If women are not aware that such kinds of additional “salary sup-
plements” are something that is being offered to others, how fair is the 
defense that they did not negotiate for them? As noted above, one female 
professor in the Texas case sent a demand letter arguing a violation of 
the Equal Pay Act.71 So her negotiation was accompanied by threat of 
legal action. That kind of litigation is expensive and it takes a terrible 
toll.72 This complete lack of transparency and information is fatal to any 
effective negotiation, even in the rare case that women ask and are met 
with positive result. 
Finally, the cases pull the curtain away to expose the practices that 
have been used to set faculty pay and additional compensation since 
women joined the legal academy in significant numbers. The Denver 
dean and the former Texas dean both relied on justifications grounded 
in past decisions about merit.73 They illustrate one of the most signifi-
cant issues identified by scholars who criticize the “other factor other 
than sex” defense. It reifies past salary decisions which were themselves 
infected with gender bias.74 It is problematic but not atypical that both 
deans pointed at these past decisions and then proceeded to suggest that 
they had neither the obligation nor the means to correct them. And per-
haps legally they did not, if employers who use prior salary as a means 
to justify paying male employees more are protected by the “market ex-
cuses defense” as it currently exists.  
 
 
                                                       
 70. Id. at 4–5. 
 71. See Attorney General Report, supra note 46, at 23. 
 72. AAUW Educ. Found. & AAUW Legal Advocacy Fund, Tenure Denied: Cases of 
Sex Discrimination in Academia 1, 63 (2004), 
http://www.case.edu/president/aaction/TenureDenied.pdf [hereinafter AAUW, Tenure De-
nied]. 
 73. See Ingold, supra note 3; Letter from Dean to Colleagues, supra note 58, at 1-3 
(stating that forgivable loans were offered to attract and retain highly-valued faculty mem-
bers, whose value was presumably determined, in part, on prior merit-based pay decisions). 
 74. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1. 
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IV. SOLUTIONS 
A. Legal Solutions 
Legal solutions include an amendment to the Equal Pay Act via the 
Paycheck Fairness Act which would “replace the current fourth affirma-
tive defense language—“any other factor other than sex”—with “a bona 
fide factor other than sex, such as education, training or experience.”75 
That Act has languished in Congress, failing to get the support of the 
Senate for a number of years. In its current version it would also state 
that the “bona fide factor” shall only apply if the employer demonstrates 
that such factor satisfied the following: “is not based upon or derived 
from a sex-based differential in compensation, is job related with respect 
to the position in question’ and is consistent with business necessity.”76 
Furthermore, this defense will not apply if the employee can demon-
strate that an alternative employment practice exists that would serve 
the employer’s business needs without producing the pay differential.”77 
In the case of a male faculty member who brings an outside offer to 
the dean, this amended language would: 
[O]nly allow the use of [an outside offer] if the employer could 
demonstrate that the factors were job-related and consistent 
with business necessity. Taking the job-related requirement 
first, it seems difficult to make an argument that . . . an outside, 
competitive offer is job-related. . . . [A]n outside offer if related to 
the job of another employer. An employer might try to argue 
that an outside competitive offer is job-related if the employee is 
threatening to leave his job if the employer does not match the 
offer. However, that is not the proper interpretation of job-
related. The language of the “job-related” and “consistent with 
business necessity” requirements is identical to the language of . 
. . Title VII.78 
Thus, the proper test is whether meeting the male employee’s com-
petitive offer is necessary for its business. If the employer decides that it 
is, it can meet the terms of the statute by raising the salaries of female 
                                                       
 75. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 862, 114th Cong. (2015). See also BENJAMIN COLLINS 
& JODY FEDERAL, CONG. RES. SERV., RL31867, PAY EQUITY: LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 9 (2013) (noting that the bill would revise the exception to the prohibition for 
a wage rate differential based on any other factor other than sex. It would limit such factors 
to bona fide factors, such as education, training, or experience. The bill would state that the 
bona fide factor defense shall apply only if the employer demonstrates that such factor: (1) is 
not based upon or derived from a sex-based differential in compensation, (2) is job-related 
with respect to the position in question, and (3) is consistent with business necessity. Makes 
such defense inapplicable where the employee demonstrates that: (1) an alternative em-
ployment practice exists that would serve the same business purpose without producing such 
differential, and (2) the employer has refused to adopt such alternative practice). 
 76. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 165. 
 77. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 165. 
 78. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 198. 




employees who are doing similar work.79 If the employer argues that is 
too expensive, that “cost defense” should rarely be accepted by courts, 
given the clear legislative intent to have employers bear some of the 
burden in meeting the goals of the Equal Pay Act.80 In academia, if a 
male recruit has neither more years of teaching experience nor an addi-
tional degree than a current female faculty member, the Paycheck Fair-
ness Act amendments would require such a result if, after looking at 
these bona fide factors other than sex, a university decided to go forward 
and hire that male recruit.  
In the Texas case, this analysis applied would mean offering simi-
lar forgivable loan salary supplements to female faculty who were doing 
the same work but who might not be able to solicit competitive offers 
due to family considerations that kept them in Austin. At the very least, 
it would make the program so expensive that it might have brought it to 
an end without a major controversy that brought negative publicity to 
the institution, undermining the program’s arguable rationale—
improving the law school’s reputation. This is particularly true in light 
of the Sauceda v. University of Texas.81 In her article for this symposi-
um,82 Professor Deborah Brake notes that in Sauceda, “[T]he court re-
jected “salary compression”—in which the university paid more to at-
tract new hires from an outside university while paying less to existing 
faculty members—as a factor other than sex, equating the employer’s 
“supply and demand” argument to the kind of stereotyped, sex-based 
assumptions embedded in the employment market that Congress sought 
to correct through the EPA.”83  
In the Denver case, it would have meant adjusting salaries so that 
the law school might have been able to argue to the central campus that 
the differential in mean/median had to be remedied by law and that the 
central campus should provide the funds to do so. If the effort to amend 
the Equal Pay Act through the Paycheck Fairness Act described above 
were eventually successful, female faculty members “should be able to 
make a convincing argument that prior salary and outside offers are not 
“job related with respect to the position in question” but rather refer to 
former and potential positions.”84 And even without enactment, the pro-
visions of the Paycheck Fairness Act have had an effect on judicial ap-
proaches to the factor-other-than-sex defense. Professor Brake notes 
that the nascent trend to narrowly construe market defenses, as the 
Paycheck Fairness Act would require if enacted, is apparent not only in 
Sauceda but also in Drum v. Leeson Electric Company85, in which, “the 
                                                       
 79. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 198–99. 
 80. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 199. 
 81. Sauceda v. Univ. of Tex., 958 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Texas 2013). 
 82. Brake, supra note 9, at 889 
 83. Brake, supra note 9, at 899. 
 84. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 166. 
 85. Drum v. Leeson Elec. Co.,  565 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 2009). 
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Eighth Circuit took a similarly dim view of reliance on market value to 
set pay . . . cautioning that courts must take care to ensure that they do 
not permit employers to pay women lower wages simply because the 
market will bear it.  The Dreves court, . . . in granting summary judg-
ment to the employee, was particularly scathing about the employer’s 
reliance on the comparator’s negotiation skill to justify his higher pay, 
admonishing that a pay disparity is no more justified when it is the re-
sult of a single negotiation than when it is the result of a market-wide 
phenomenon in a market that differently values the work of men and 
women.”86   
 
B. Voluntary Solutions 
Even without the Paycheck Fairness Act amendments to the Equal 
Pay Act, law school deans can implement voluntary solutions.87 These 
include implementing pay transparency, banning negotiation and 
matching competitive offers, ignoring prior salaries and using more ri-
gor in setting pay.88 In January 2016, President Obama announced that 
by federal rule all companies with more than 100 employees would have 
to break down and report pay data by race, ethnicity and gender in an 
effort to increase transparency and close the pay gap.89 As we have seen 
above, pay transparency may exist at public institutions in academia. 
But even then, private donor endowments for chairs and soft money for 
program director stipends or additional compensation to secure a hire 
from funds other than law school funds, e.g. president and central cam-
pus funds, can still make it difficult for female faculty to discover that 
they are being paid less for doing exactly the same job. 
And deans could ban negotiation in dealing with faculty recruits. 
Women tend to negotiate less and get punished more than their male 
                                                       
 86. Brake, supra note 9, at 900 (citing Dreves v. Hudson Grp. Retail, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 82636 (D. Vt. 2013) in which, “the Court rejected several factors commonly asserted 
under the FOTS defense, prior salary, inducement, and negotiation.”). 
 87. Note that even if the Paycheck Fairness Act is enacted, it will not be a panacea.  
As Professor Deborah Brake notes in her article for this Symposium, “Even if the anything-
goes approach to the FOTS defense were replaced with a job-relatedness and business neces-
sity standard, however, the problem would remain that many courts will never reach the 
defense because of the strict approach to the similarity required to make out a prima facie 
case of unequal pay for substantially equal work.  Doctrinally, increasing judicial scrutiny of 
the strength of the employer’s reason will not help clear this hurdle.  And yet, shifting the 
equal pay claim away from a search for deliberate discriminatory intent may, indirectly, lead 
courts to view this threshold issue differently.” Brake, supra note 9, at 910. 
 88. See Eisenberg, supra note 9. 
 89. Laura Putre, The Lowdown on Obama’s New Equal Pay Rule, INDUSTRY WEEK 
(Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.industryweek.com/labor-employment-policy/lowdown-obamas-
new-equal-pay-rule.  




counterparts when they ask for salary increases.90 Moving to a flat offer 
would have a significant effect on closing the gender gap.91 
Another answer is to ban pay negotiation completely. That is 
what Ellen Pao did when she was chief executive of Reddit. The 
company established pay ranges based on roles and experience 
and gave applicants nonnegotiable offers. “We put the onus on 
the company to pay fairly instead of on candidates to negotiate 
fair pay,” Ms. Pao wrote in The Hollywood Reporter. . . .92  
Deans could also conduct comprehensive reviews of the existing salary 
array. Women fare far worse when prior salaries are considered that 
already reflect a biased market, either too low for the woman herself or 
too high in a colleague coming in as a lateral hire.93 Such studies could 
yield important information in salary distortions that were likely the 
result of such bias: 
If women can lose millions over their careers because they get 
job offers based on pay that is already low, one way to stop the 
pattern is to ignore their past salaries. Google has said it does 
this and instead makes offers based on what a job is worth. In 
August, the federal Office of Personnel Management said gov-
ernment hiring managers could no longer rely on an employee’s 
previous salary when setting his or her new one. The acting di-
rector, Beth Cobert, explained that the practice particularly dis-
advantaged women who had taken time off to raise children. 
Women are also more likely to have worked in the lower-paying 
public or nonprofit sectors.” “Don’t ask about salary history for 
new hires, and it really reduces the impact of previous discrimi-
nation,” Ms. Babcock said. “I think that is the most effective 
thing organizations can do.”94 
Paying for the job and not the person is the right thing to do in ac-
ademia. Men and women who are of the same rank should be paid the 
same. They teach the same number of credits, have the same publica-
tion expectations and do the same committee work. In fact, there is sub-
stantial evidence that women actually do more invisible work than men 
who hold the same rank in academia.95 
                                                       
 90. Margaret A. Neale & Thomas Z. Lys, More Reasons Women Need to Negotiate 
Their Salaries, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 29, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/06/more-reasons-
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 91. Linda Babcock & Sara Laschever, Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the Gen-
der Divide 1–2 (2003). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 Legal education is in crisis. The New York Times and the Wall 
Street Journal continue their drumbeat that it is overpriced and under-
performing in terms of jobs for its graduates.96 That critique has been 
refuted by some,97 but it generally resonates with the public and much 
of the professoriate itself. The arms race for U.S. News rankings has 
had much to do with distorting the functions of the law school itself. The 
heart of that enterprise sits in the classroom but the clamor to move up 
the rankings, a dominantly masculine form of competing for status with-
in hierarchy, has brought legal education to its knees.  
I have argued in the past that the undervaluation of teaching at 
the expense of certain kinds of scholarship is linked to that arms race.98 
I have also argued that it is connected to the influx of women into the 
legal academy in significant numbers and the association of teaching 
with feminine norms.99 In this piece, I have argued for amending one of 
the major legislative enforcement mechanisms available to remedy pay 
discrimination based on gender. I would go one step further and predict 
that if the Equal Pay Act market defense were amended, we would see a 
healthier, more robust focus on the heart of the law school enterprise—
                                                                                                                                
Place: Sex Segregation and the Domestication of Female Academics, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 
777, 786–87 (2001); Kristen Monroe et al., Gender Equality in Academia: Bad News from the 
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the classroom. No one is being given six-figure salary supplements in 
legal academia because they have won teaching awards. Such supple-
ments are linked to perceived value of certain kinds of scholarship in the 
narrow market of law schools themselves.  
The U.S. News distortion of that market is in large part to blame 
for this odd world where a degree from one particular law school and 
fewer years of practice experience are valued more highly than more 
years of such experience when faculty hiring is at stake. And where 
scholarship alone has become the singular measure of value in terms of 
faculty compensation.100 If we look at whether scholarship alone has 
much to do with “performing the job” as the Equal Pay Act requires, I 
think the argument is clear that it does not. If we moved away from 
such singular measures of value and toward a more holistic approach to 
defining what it means to perform the job of a law professor, legal edu-
cation as a whole would begin its long, slow climb back to health and 
students, most faculty members and the public as a whole would be the 
beneficiaries. Both women and men in academia should support the 
Paycheck Fairness Act amendments as a means to that end. 
                                                       
100. This is not a singular phenomenon of American law schools. Monopoli, supra 
note 5, at 1759 n.87 (quoting Park, supra note 99, at 50) (“Why should research be the pri-
mary criterion for tenure and promotion? One line of argument, which focuses on research as 
an indicator of faculty merit, goes something like this: ‘Research separates the men from the 
boys (or the women from the girls). Teaching and service won’t serve this function because 
everyone teaches and does committee work.’ A variation on this theme argues that 
‘[t]eaching and service won’t serve this function because there is no satisfactory way of eval-
uating teaching and service.’ According to the first line of reasoning, research performance is 
the only factor that differentiates faculty presumed to be equal in other respects. According 
to the second line of reasoning, research performance is the only factor by which faculty 
members can be objectively evaluated, even if they are unequal in other respects.” (footnote 
omitted)). Monopoli, supra note 5, at 1760 n.88 (quoting Park, supra note 99, at 50) (The 
author writes: “Current working assumptions regarding (1) what constitutes good research, 
teaching, and service and (2) the relative importance of each of these endeavors reflect and 
perpetuate masculine values and practices, thus preventing the professional advancement of 
female faculty both individually and collectively. A gendered division of labor exists within 
(as outside) the contemporary academy wherein research is implicitly deemed “men’s work” 
and is explicitly valued, whereas teaching and service are characterized as “women’s work” 
and explicitly devalued.”).  
